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Monday, February 8, 2021
Admission & Confession in Cyber Crime Cases
Friday, January 15, 2021
WhatsApp Chats as evidence in courts: Case Laws in India
As a cyber lawyer, one of the questions I get asked frequently is whether Whatsapp messages can be adduced as evidence in court. Some clients think that because of its “informal” nature, Whatsapp messages would not be admissible as evidence. However, this assumption is inaccurate since there have been many instances where the Indian Courts have allowed Whatsapp messages to be adduced as evidence.
In January 2021, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had observed that WhatsApp messages will have no evidentiary value unless they are certified as per Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (Rakesh Kumar Singla vs Union Of India) .
In State of Haryana Versus Hardik Sikri & Ors, On May 24, 2017 the haryana state trial court recognized WhatsApp chat as evidence and sentenced the three former law students of OP Jindal Global University in Sonepat – 20 years imprisonment to main accused Hardik Sikri and his friend Karan Chhabra for gangraping and blackmailing a junior management student for two years, and seven-year jail term to third accused Vikas Garg.
“The WhatsApp chats running into pages is so abusive and vulgar that the extracts of the same cannot be explained and put into the judgment and what only can be concluded through the WhatsApp chat is that the prosecutrix (victim) was totally under control and dominance of the accused, Hardik,” additional sessions judge (ASJ) Sunita Grover
In Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd v KS Infraspace LLP Limited and Another, the Supreme Court, while hearing a petition challenging an injunction order made a reference to the Whatsapp chats produced as evidence in the case. "The WhatsApp messages which are virtual verbal communications are matters of evidence with regard to their meaning and its contents to be proved during the trial by evidence - in - chief and cross-examination. The emails and WhatsApp messages will have to be read and understood cumulatively to decipher whether there was a concluded contract or not".
There is a recent order of the Gujarat High Court as well, which referred to Whatsapp conversations to form a prima facie opinion regarding grant of bail (Chirag Dipakbhai Sulekha vs State Of Gujarat)
The Delhi High Court in a case has held that a Whatsapp forward message, without an unknown source, cannot be treated as evidence (National Lawyers Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms v Union of India). The Court held that such a forwarded message, without its original, cannot be regarded as a 'document' under the Evidence Act.
In Nivrutti Gaikwad Versus State of Mah. & Pooja Gaikwad (2020(2) Criminal Court Cases 735 (Bombay)
It was held that Exchange of messages on personal account of two persons, Not public place - However, if messages are posted in Whatsapp Group then it is public place as all members of the group have access to those messages.
The NCLAT in the matter of Bhandari Hosiery Exports Ltd. & Ors vs. In-Time Garments Pvt. Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 143 of 2019, decided on 1 March 2019, took on record a text message sent over WhatsApp messenger by a corporate debtor to an operational creditor complaining about the quality of goods supplied. On basis of this WhatsApp message, the Court held that there was a ‘pre-existing dispute’ under Section 9 of the Code and accordingly Insolvency Application could not be admitted on account of a pre-existence dispute.
Moreover, Hon. Supreme Court of India, vide Order dated 10.07.2020 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 3/2020 in 'Re: Cognizance For Extension of Limitation' had allowed the service of summons via electronic mode including WhatsApp.
Liability of Group Admin
WhatsApp group admin can’t be held liable for member’s post unless common intention shown held by Bombay High Court :Alleged Crime was under Section 67 of the IT Act, 2000 (related to obscenity)
Kishor v State of Maharashtra [2021] GCtR 787 (Nagpur, Bombay HC) 01/03/2021 in Criminal Application (APL) 573/2016 .
R. Rajendran v. The Inspector of Police & Kathirvel
Case No: Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8010 of 2021 & CRL.M.P.(MD)No.4123 of 2021
Forse v Secarma Ltd , Wells and Solari v PNC Global Logistics, Darren Case v Tai Tarian are some of the foreign case laws
Conclusion :
The general principle is that Whatsapp messages in the form of print outs or the mobile device showing chats can be admissible as evidence. This is especially where there is no dispute as to the authenticity of the Whatsapp message, and no dispute as to the identity of the parties to the Whatsapp conversation. Bearing in mind the findings of the cases above, parties who intend to adduce Whatsapp messages as evidence in their court cases should still ensure that:
- the snapshots of their discussions contain the necessary information to identify the sender/recipient of the messages.
- The owner of the phone or laptop or computer from where the WhatsApp chats are extracted/printed should produce a signed IEA section 65B certificate.
- they don’t wholly rely on Whatsapp messages to build their case, especially when there are other documents available that would be able to conclusively prove the facts in issue.
- If the print out of chat is produced with IEA section 65B certificate it will be considered as secondary evidence, if the phone or laptop or computer is produced it will be considered as primary evidence
Friday, January 8, 2021
Banks should compensate account holder if customer loses money due to online fraud: National Consumer Court
The Commission blamed the bank for a mistake within their system while passing the judgment in one of the case in which the victim alleged that the money was withdrawn from her account by a hacker. The victim believed that the hacking was done due to a mistake in the bank’s electronic banking system.
It was observed by the commission that the bank could not present any such evidence, which showed that the credit card of the victim was stolen after which the commission ordered the bank to compensate the victim.
In one of the other cases, Jesna Jose, the complainant who lives abroad, will also receive around Rs 80,000 in interest and compensation. Jose had submitted the complaint before the district consumer forum in 2009. She said she procured the card in 2007 and the fraud took place in 2008. The commission rejected the bank’s claim that the woman had not taken care of the card and hence was liable for the fraud.
According to the RBI advisory, who will bear the loss will be decided by whose fault it is. If there is negligence or mistake on the part of the bank, then the entire loss will be borne by the bank. On the other hand, if the fraud is due to the negligence of the customer, then the customer will have to suffer the loss. In a situation where it is neither the fault of the customer nor the fault of the bank, then if the customer lodges a complaint with the bank within 3 working days of the fraud, then the customer will not be responsible for the fraud.
Monday, December 28, 2020
Loan Apps : How they loot the customers ?
Insta Loan fraud & mobile apps
These Insta Loan applications are developed in such a way that on installing these apps they get access to the contacts, mobile information and other data on the device. These applications collect the Id proofs, PAN card, KYC documents, and bank account details of the customers.
They check the genuineness of the documents and disburse small amounts in the form of a loan to their bank accounts by debiting the processing charges and GST ie, 25-30 per cent in advance. Loans are given for either seven days or 15 days.
After the due date, the company categorises the customers into various buckets - S-0, S-1, S-2, S-3, M2, M3, X etc. The customers in a lower bucket get a decent treatment but as the bucket category goes up the treatment gets harsher. The call centres of the company abuse the customers in filthy language and threaten them with dire consequences. They even go to the extent of accessing the contacts of the customers from their phone and start abusing and threatening the family members, relatives and friends with calls and messages. Using the stolen data, they threaten the customers with dire consequences like rape. In many cases, they created new WhatsApp groups using the victim’s phone book and sent lewd messages to the members.
They also blackmail innocent people by sending fake legal notices. Telecallers also suggest victims make the repayments by taking loans from their other loan applications. The customer falls into their trap by taking loans in the other loan applications as suggested by telecallers and end up paying huge amounts and get stuck in a never-ending cycle.
There are around 500 chinese such Apps, it’s time that India brings in a regulator for such Apps .
To protect yourself from such loan Apps fraud you must:
- use a different secondary mobile phone and instrument if you require a Insta loan .
- Never download any insta loan apps without verifying their licenses issued by government authorities.
- Go through the terms and conditions and verify the licenses of the companies that are offering loan and whether the licenses have been obtained from the concerned authorities like RBI, District Collector.
- Never download any app that asks to give access to the contacts, files, photo gallery, etc.
Tuesday, December 15, 2020
Criminal Investigation Robotics and Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the combination of algorithms designed with the purpose of creating devices that present capabilities similar to those of the human being. A type of technology that is beginning to be present in everyday life in the most common applications, even for home use such as Siri and Alexa cell phone assistants, or facial recognition applications such as those used by the Argentine government in systems such as ANSES (National Administration of Social Security “Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social”) and the AFIP (Federal Administration of Public Revenue “Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos”).
Authors Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, two academic classics of Computer Science, defined the “types” of artificial intelligence according to their application in the following categories:
– Systems that “think” like humans (e.g., artificial neural networks).
– Systems that act like humans (e.g., robots).
– Systems that learn and generate new knowledge (e.g., expert systems).
Within the branch of systems that emulate the human way of thinking in the aforementioned categories, we find ourselves with two techniques that are increasingly used: Deep Learning and Machine Learning algorithms.
It can be said that Machine Learning has a side called Deep Learning. While both technologies refer to systems capable of learning on their own, Deep Learning is more complex and sophisticated, and it is also more autonomous, which means that once the system has been programmed, human intervention is minimal.
More dangerous than the famous ‘fake news’, the ‘deepfake’ are videos manipulated using artificial intelligence techniques such as those cited. The result is extremely realistic.
Another example is Deepfakeapp published as an application that allowed any computer novice to manipulate videos, a tool specially designed for those popularly known as ‘revenge porn’ (*), that is, the unauthorized and malicious publication of intimate images.
In 2018, a video in which an alleged Barak Obama called Donald Trump an imbecile circled the world. It was a fake recording in which actor Jordan Peele and Buzzfeed CEO Jonah Peretti were trying to raise awareness of the danger of unverified information and the Deepfake. In any case, one of the first steps when investigating the origin of a video or image is to verify the source: Who sent this? Who signs it? Is it reliable? Tracing the path of the so-called Deepfake, seeing where it was first shared, and who published it are some basic steps to take that don’t require advanced knowledge, just common sense.
In 2019, what was classified as the “first crime committed with artificial intelligence” was discovered in the United Kingdom and brought to justice in that country. In a short article published by The Wall Street Journal, explains the story of a group of cybercriminals who managed to impersonate the voice of the executive director of an energy company and demanded an urgent transfer of 243,000 euros and that worked for them as a deception method. The CEO of the company reportedly thought he was on the phone with the CEO of the parent company, who asked him for the money for a suspected supplier in Hungary. The cybercriminal made the request seem extremely urgent, saying the money needed to be transferred within an hour. The victim, in subsequent statements, said that she even heard her boss’s slight German accent, as well as the tone of her voice.
The predictions about this type of attack are not very encouraging: the voice recordings necessary to train the algorithm in high-profile people are very easy to obtain: in television interviews, radio, social networks, and WhatsApp audios, have enough minutes of recording so that the algorithm is in a position to replace any voice tone with that of the person you want to impersonate.
How will we validate false “confessions” made with these techniques? How will we argue that someone did not say what we are hearing? Will the videos that prove the alleged presence of a person in a place to try to exonerate them be valid from these techniques?
In the framework of a criminal investigation, we must begin to request the technical opinion of experts from the Scientific Police. We can no longer rely solely on the image and the video to consider them, alone, proof. In our prospective analysis, we must include the acquisition of forensic imaging and video tools, in the same way that today practically all investigative agencies are clear that it is necessary to have tools for the analysis of mobile devices.
And what happens when we apply these techniques to Robotics?
How do we deal with the “responsibility” or “attribution” of a crime when the one who commits it is a Robot? A robot is neither more nor less than a machine (hardware) that contains an operating system (software) and that performs operations through different algorithms. Since the first robotic arms used to handle materials, much progress has been made.
One aspect of this area that worries the field of law most is civil liability. That is, the obligation to indemnify a third party that arises from damage caused involuntarily. The problem that arises is that, under current legislation, a robot cannot be responsible for acts or omissions that may cause harm to third parties. Judges judge people, not robots, let alone algorithms.
It seems reasonable that the responsible party is “the manufacturer”, but as observed in different legal discussions on this topic in international settings, producers will be responsible for the damages caused by their products only in the case where they are defective.
Therefore, what happens if the damage caused is not a consequence of a manufacturing defect? What happens if it is damage caused by a rule that the robot learned with Deep Learning and Machine Learning techniques? What happens if someone “teaches” or, as we said above, “trains” the algorithm for unwanted behavior by the manufacturer and causes damage? What if the robot suffers a cyber attack and its learning and inference rules change?
Different options are evaluated in the world when determining what type of “legal status” should be applied to a robot and an algorithm. As an example of these proposals, regarding possible “legal natures” we can cite the opinion made by María José Santos González, coordinator of the Legal Department of the National Institute of Cybersecurity in Spain, which based on existing legislation in Europe she makes a very interesting rundown and analysis of the well-known figures, summarized for the Ibero-American Legal News Review:
a) “(…) Robot as a natural person. This possibility does not seem adequate given that article 30 of the Civil Code determines that live birth is necessary to acquire personality. Therefore, this cannot happen in a robot. “
b) “Robot as a legal person. Nor does it seem appropriate to endow robots with this type of personality because robots can interact directly with the environment and even cause damage, while, in the case of a legal person, it will always be the company’s representatives who make the decisions in the last resort and will therefore be responsible. “
c) “Robot as an animal. The fact that a robot has no biological or genetic basis or the fact that a robot today cannot have feelings makes it impossible to equate a robot to an animal. “
d) “Robot as a thing. For the Civil Code, concretely in article 333, a thing is an inanimate being, devoid of life, characteristics that a robot does not have, given that it can move and interact with the environment (…)”
Given that both a robot and an algorithm do not fit into any of these categories, will a new legal framework be necessary for these issues? Should we rethink the concept of life as some propose?
Let’s imagine for a moment a Robot or an algorithm as a subject of law. What would be the penalty? Who applies it? Where is the data stored to “turn it off”?
The liability problem could supposedly be solved partially; either by introducing a civil law supervisory duty for the owner of the AI or by granting legal personhood for AI’s and thus create AI criminal liability. None of these solutions are sufficiently correcting the liability problem, though. But, a supervisory duty for the owner would be the most suitable solution of these two. It has the possibility to qualify the defendant’s behaviour as wrong when he or she breaches the civil law duty and the AI as a consequence causes (foreseeable) harm. The conclusion could be that criminal law may not be the best branch of law to solve these problems, and the liability problem with AI in criminal law remains yet to be discovered.
Sunday, November 29, 2020
FIR : All you want to know about in a criminal case
The first information report is a report giving information of the commission of a cognizable crime,
which may be made by the complainant (the term “Complainant” has been used herein the popular
sense) or by any other person knowing about the commission of such an offence. It is intended to set
the criminal law in motion.
A First Information Report is the most important document and forms the basis of the case for
prosecution. The word „First Information Report‟ has not been defined in the CrPC. By practice it has
come to mean the information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and recorded under Sec.
154 CrPC.
The principal object of FIR is only to make a complaint to the police officer to set the criminal law in
motion while the secondary objective is to obtain early information of an alleged criminal activity and
to record the circumstances before there is time for such circumstances to be forgotten or embellished.
FIR: Its Characteristics:
¾ It must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
¾ It should be given to the OC of a police station.
¾ It should be earliest in point of time.
FIR: Other Features:
¾ It may be in writing.
¾ If given orally, it shall be reduced to writing by the police officer.
¾ It should be signed by the person giving it.
¾ A copy of it should be delivered to the informant free of cost.
¾ It may be made by any person, whether or not he has the first-hand knowledge about the crime
reported except in certain specified cases.
¾ Delay, if any, in making the FIR should be explained in the FIR itself.
¾ Strictly speaking, the Telegrams and telephonic messages cannot be treated as FIR, because
they are not given in writing duly signed by the informant nor they are reduced to writing by the
police and read over to the informant. Moreover, there is hardly any guarantee as to their
genuineness / authenticity.
¾ Refusal by Informant to sign the FIR is punishable u/s 180 IPC.
FIR: Its Basic Objects:
¾ To set the criminal law in motion through the agency of the police.
¾ To furnish to the police early information of an alleged criminal activity.
Value of the FIR:
¾ It is valuable because it gives the earliest version of the occurrence.
¾ It is not a substantive piece of evidence.
¾ It can be used for the purpose of corroboration u/s 157 Indian Evidence Act.
¾ It should relate to the commission of a cognizable offence.
¾ It should be the information which set the police on their investigation.
¾ It should be given in writing or should be reduced to writing.
¾ It should have been read over to the person who made it and signed by such person.
¾ It should be entered in a book kept for the purpose.
Disposal of FIR:
An FIR once started, shall on no account be cancelled by the officer in charge, nor it is permissible for
a Magistrate or any other Police officer to do so. Recording of FIR means starting of an investigation
of a cognizable case which can only be concluded in any of the following ways:
¾ By refusing investigation under sec.157 (b) CrPC
¾ By transferring it to a different police station on question of jurisdiction.
¾ By submitting a final report after such an investigation or,
¾ By submitting a charge sheet after an investigation.
Value of FIR:
The FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence. It is relevant in judging the veracity of the prosecution
case and value to be attached to it depends on the facts of each case. It is used either to corroborate or
to contradict the oral evidence of the maker of the FIR during trial of the case.
Quashing of FIR:
FIR drawn up on the basis of information which does not disclose any offence or discloses only non-
cognizable offence can be quashed by the High Court by invoking power under Art. 226 of the
Constitution of India or under Sec. 482 CrPC.
Concept of ZERO FIR:
“There is a concept of “Zero-FIR”. It means that a FIR can be filed in any police station
(i.e.irrespective of place of incident/jurisdiction) and the same can be later transferred to the
appropriate Police Station.
There are two rulings of the Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi on 5/10/1999
(AIR 1999, 1031) and in Ramesh Kumari vs Govt. of NCT Delhi on 21/2/2006. In the former case, the
Court held that at the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot
be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of particular police
station would not have territorial jurisdiction. That apart, section 156(2) of the CrPC contains an
embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no
territorial power to investigate the case. In the latter case, the Court held that a police officer is duty
bound to register the case on the basis of such information disclosing a cognizable offence u/s 154(1)
of the CrPC. The legal position stated above expects that the police shall register an FIR upon receipt
of information of the commission of a cognizable offence. Further, if after registration of FIR, upon
investigation, it is found that the subject matter relates to the jurisdiction of some other police station,
the FIR may be appropriately transferred to the police station in which the case falls. Moreover, if at
the time of registration of FIR, it becomes apparent that the crime was committed outside the
jurisdiction of the police station, the police should be appropriately instructed to register a „Zero‟ FIR,
ensure that the FIR is transferred to the concerned police station u/s 170 of the CrPC. It should be
clearly stated that the delay over the determination of the jurisdiction leads to avoidable wastage of
time which impacts on the victim and also leads to offenders getting an opportunity to slip from the
clutches of the law.
Some Important Rulings related to FIR
1. Criteria for registering First Information Report:
The condition, which is sine qua non for recording FIR is that there must be an information and
that information must disclose cognizable offence. It is, therefore, clear that if any information
disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before officer in charge of a Police Station transpiring the
Thursday, November 19, 2020
Brazilian LGPD & European GDPR Compared
Brazilian LGPD & European GDPR Compared
Brazilian LGPD & European GDPR Compared Brazilian General Data Protection Law (Lei Geral de Protecao de Dados or LGPD), a law with many similarities to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (the “GDPR”) is now effective. On April 29 of this year, Brazil’s President issued Provisional Measure 959 that, amongst other things, postponed the effective date of the LGPD, which was originally set to be effective August 2020, to May 3, 2021. Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies amended the measure so that the LGPD would take effect in December 2020. The Senate then decided that any postponement was void because the effective date had already been decided by Congress. The amended measure was sent to the President for his signature, providing him with the date of September 17, 2020 to sign the measure, which would make the law effective as of the original effective date, or veto it. The President sanctioned the law and the LGPD is now effective. Although the law has taken effect, the LGPD’s enforcement provisions take effect August 1, 2021 (in Portuguese), and the provisions will be enforced by Brazil’s data protection authority, a Autoridade Nacional de Proteção Dados Pessoais (the “ANPD”), which the President established by decree in August (in Portuguese). However, the LGPD’s private right of action for violations of data subjects’ rights is effective now. Businesses should continue to take steps to comply with the statute given its effective date and private right of action and should prepare now for when administrative sanctions become enforceable next year.
Businesses that are GDPR compliant may be well on their way to achieving compliance with the LGPD given the similarities between the legal frameworks. Yet, businesses should be mindful of several differences that may impact how they adjust their GDPR compliance programs to meet the requirements of the LGPD to the extent that businesses process data applicable to both regimes.
At a glance. This post highlights some of the material provisions of the LGPD and compares them to their equivalents in the GDPR.
Applicability. Similar to the GDPR, the LGPD applies broadly to a wide range of data processing activities, data subjects, and their information.
- The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data if such data is processed in the EU or if the purpose of the processing is to offer goods or services to or monitor the behavior of EU residents. Arts. 2 and 3 GDPR.
- The LGPD applies to the processing of personal data if such data is processed in Brazil, the purpose of the processing is to offer or provide goods or services to Brazil residents or the personal data processed belongs to Brazilian residents or was collected in Brazil. Art. 3 LGPD.
Lawful Processing of Non-Special Categories of Personal Data. Businesses likely will be able to process data under the same legal bases provided under the LGPD and the GDPR.
- Under the GDPR, the processing is lawful if the data subject has consented or processing is necessary to perform a contract, comply with legal obligations, protect a natural person’s vital interests, act in the public interest, or achieve a legitimate interest of the controller or third party under certain conditions. Art. 6 GDPR.
- The LGPD includes all of the legal bases for processing listed under the GDPR. In addition, the LGPD provides that controllers may process personal data specifically to exercise rights in judicial, administrative or arbitration procedures and to protect credit. Art. 7 LGPD.
Lawful Processing of Special or Sensitive Categories of Personal Data. Although the LGPD and the GDPR share several legal bases for processing sensitive information, the LGPD does not allow businesses to process such data under the bases identified under GDPR for legitimate activities of nonprofit entities and public data.
- Under the GDPR, the processing of special categories of personal data is prohibited unless (i) the data subject has consented; (ii) data is processed under certain conditions in the course of legitimate activities of nonprofit entities in connection with their purposes; (iii) processing relates to data made public by the data subject; or (iv) processing is necessary to comply with employment, social security or social protection law, to protect the vital interest of natural persons, to exercise or defend legal claims or for public interest reasons, including those related to public health or research purposes. Art. 9 GDPR.
- The LGDP allows processing of sensitive categories of personal data if the data subject consents or processing is necessary for (i) the controller to comply with a legal obligation; (ii) shared processing of data when necessary by the public administration for the execution of public policies; (iii) research purposes, (iv) exercising rights, including in connection with a contract and in a judicial, administrative and arbitration proceeding, (v) protecting vital interests of a data subject or a third party, including health in a medical procedure, or (vi) preventing fraud and protect the security of the data subject. Art. 11 LGPD.
Data Subject Rights. The LGPD provides to data subjects the right to data anonymization in addition to the other rights provided under the GDPR and requires businesses to respond to rights requests within fifteen (15) days.
- Under the GDPR, data subjects have the right to access, rectification, erasure, restriction, data portability, and objection, and the right against automated decision-making. Chp. 3 GDPR.
- In addition to the rights provided under the GDPR, the LGPD provides data subjects the right to request that their data be anonymized. Art. 18 LGPD. However, in response to a request to delete under the GDPR, controllers may anonymize data because, similar to the LGPD, anonymized data is not considered personal data under the GDPR.
Children’s Personal Data. The LGPD has a broader requirement than the GDPR to obtain consent for processing children’s personal data and extends heightened protection to children whose personal data is processed similar to the GDPR.
- Before collecting personal data of children who are younger than sixteen (16) years of age, the GDPR requires controllers to obtain the consent of a child’s legal guardian subject to certain exceptions. Any information directed to children should be provided using clear and plain language. Art. 8 GDPR.
- The LGPD broadly requires controllers to obtain the consent of a legal guardian before processing children’s data. Information directed towards children needs to be appropriate for the children’s understanding. Art. 14 LGPD.
International Transfer of Data. The LGPD provides similar mechanisms to the GDPR for transferring personal data to third countries and international organizations. Unlike the GDPR, the LGPD does not provide a list of specific derogations but many are covered by the law.
- The GDPR allows the transfer of personal data to a third country or an international organization on the bases of (i) an adequacy decision, (ii) appropriate safeguards such as binding corporate rules, standard contractual clauses, and approved codes of conduct and certification mechanisms, (iii) an international agreement; and (iv) derogations for specific situations, which includes when the transfer is made from a register intended to provide information to the public or by any person on the basis of legitimate interests. Chp. 5 GDPR.
- The LGPD allows the international transfer of personal data on the bases of (i) an adequacy decision, (ii) compliance with the LGPD as shown through contractual clauses, global corporate rules, and stamps, certificates and codes of conduct, (iii) international agreements and cooperation, (iv) the vital interest of the data subject or a third party; (v) ANPD approval, (vi) public interest; and (vii) data subject consent. Art. 33 LGPD. Unlike the GDPR, the LGPD does not provide for international transfers on the basis of a register intending to provide information to the public or legitimate interests as provided under the GDPR.
Controller and Processor Obligations. Generally, the LGDP has similar controller and processor obligations to the GDPR with differences in data record maintenance, data protection impact assessment, and the appointment of data protection officers.
- Under the GDPR, controllers and processors are required to maintain records of processing data activities; implement appropriate and technical measures, including data protection policies, to protect personal data; conduct data protection impact assessments in certain circumstances; provide notice of data breaches to supervisory authorities and data subjects; and designate a data protection offer under certain conditions. Chp. 4 GDPR.
- Similarly, the LGPD requires controllers and processors to maintain processing records; adopt security, technical and administrative measures to protect personal data; conduct data protection impact reports upon the ANPD’s request; provide notice of certain security incidents; and appoint a data protection officer. Chp. IV §§ I and II; Chp. VII §§ I and II; and Art. 41 LGPD.
Security Breach Notifications. The LGPD has a lower threshold than the GDPR for providing notice of security incidents and a potentially longer timeframe than the GDPR in which to provide notice to regulators.
- Under the GDPR, controllers are required to provide notice (a) to supervisory authorities within seventy-two (72) hours unless the security incident is unlikely to result in a risk to data subjects and (b) to data subjects without undue delay if the security incident is likely to result in a high risk to the data subjects. Arts. 33 and 34 GDPR.
- The LGPD requires businesses to notify within a reasonable amount of time the ANPD and affected data subjects if the incident may cause harm to data subjects. Art. 48 LGPD.
Administrative Sanctions. The LGPD imposes significantly less severe fines than the GDPR since they are based on businesses’ revenue in Brazil as compared to fines based on businesses’ revenue worldwide as provided under the GDPR.
- Under the GDPR, controllers and processors may be subject to a fine of two percent (2%) of worldwide revenue up to 10,000,000 EUR for lower-level violations and four percent (4%) of worldwide revenue up to 20,000,000 EUR for higher-level violations. Art. 83 GDPR.
- Under the LPGD, controllers and processors may be subject to a fine of up to two percent (2%) of revenues in Brazil up to a total of R$ 50,000,000. Art. 52 LGPD.
Law enforcement
In the case of Brazilian law, the supervisory authority is referred to as the ANPD (National Data Protection Authority) (Article 55). In the case of GDPR, it's the European Data Protection Board (Article 68).
To Conclude
In practice, if your company is already GDPR compliant, it can easily be LGPD compliant as well; and vice versa. There's a very visible convergence between LGPD and GDPR. But a Privacy Expert Lawyer or Law firm needs to evaluate your legal risk and compliance based on emerging case laws. Also, the fact is that both laws still need time to gain maturity and to be better evaluated.
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